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We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game
affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a
fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure
Nash equilibria arising when random utility tables are assigned to
the players. We provide conditions for the structure of the graph
under which equilibria are likely to exist and complementary condi-
tions which make the existence of equilibria highly unlikely. Our re-
sults have immediate implications for many deterministic graphs and
generalize known results for random games on the complete graph.
In particular, our results imply that the probability that bounded
degree graphs have pure Nash equilibria is exponentially small in
the size of the graph and yield a simple algorithm that finds small
nonexistence certificates for a large family of graphs. Then we show
that in any strongly connected graph of n vertices with expansion
(1 + Ω(1)) log2(n) the distribution of the number of equilibria ap-
proaches the Poisson distribution with parameter 1, asymptotically
as n→+∞.
In order to obtain a refined characterization of the degree of con-
nectivity associated with the existence of equilibria, we also study the
model in the random graph setting. In particular, we look at the case
where the interaction graph is drawn from the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi, G(n,p),
model where each edge is present independently with probability p.
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For this model we establish a double phase transition for the exis-
tence of pure Nash equilibria as a function of the average degree pn,
consistent with the nonmonotone behavior of the model. We show
that when the average degree satisfies np > (2 + Ω(1)) loge(n), the
number of pure Nash equilibria follows a Poisson distribution with
parameter 1, asymptotically as n→∞. When 1/n≪ np < (0.5 −
Ω(1)) loge(n), pure Nash equilibria fail to exist with high probabil-
ity. Finally, when np= O(1/n) a pure Nash equilibrium exists with
constant probability.
1. Introduction. In recent years there has been a convergence of ideas
from computer science and the social sciences aiming to model and analyze
large complex networks such as the web graph, social networks and recom-
mendation systems. From the computational perspective, it has been recog-
nized that the successful design of algorithms performed on such networks,
including routing, ranking and recommendation algorithms, must take into
account the social dynamics and economic incentives as well as the technical
properties that govern these networks [20, 24, 27].
Game theory has been very successful in modeling strategic behavior in
large systems of economically incentivized entities. In the context of routing,
for instance, it has been employed to study the effect of selfishness on the
efficiency of a network, whereby the performance of the network at equilib-
rium is compared to the performance when a central authority can simply
dictate a solution [7, 29, 31, 32]. The effect of selfishness has been studied
in several other settings, for example, load balancing [8, 9, 21, 30], facility
location [34] and network design [3].
A simple way to model interactions between agents in a large network
is with a graphical game [19]: a graph G= (V,E) is defined whose vertices
represent the players of the game, and an edge (v,w) ∈ E corresponds to
the strategic interaction between players v and w; each player v ∈ V has a
finite set of strategies Sv, which throughout this paper will be assumed to
be binary so that there are two possible strategies for each player. A utility,
or payoff, table uv for player v assigns a real number uv(σv, σN (v)) to every
selection of strategies by player v and the players in v’s neighborhood, that
is, the set of nodes v′ such that (v, v′) ∈E, denoted by N (v). A pure Nash
equilibrium (PNE) of the game is some state, or strategy profile, σ of the
game, assigning to every player v a single strategy σv ∈ Sv , such that no
player has a unilateral incentive to deviate. Equivalently, for every player
v ∈ V ,
uv(σv, σN (v))≥ uv(σ′v, σN (v)) for every strategy σ′v ∈ Sv.(1)
When condition (1) is satisfied, we say that the strategy σv is a best response
to the strategies σN (v).
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The concept of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is more compelling,
decision theoretically, than the concept of the mixed strategy Nash equilib-
rium, its counterpart that allows players to choose distributions over their
strategy sets. This is because it is not always meaningful in applications to
assume that the players of a game may adopt randomized strategies. Unfor-
tunately, unlike mixed Nash equilibria, PNE do not always exist. It is then
an important problem to study how the existence of PNE depends on the
properties of the game.
The focus of this paper is to understand how the connectivity of the
underlying graph affects the existence of a PNE. We obtain two kinds of
results. The first concerns the existence of a PNE in an ensemble of random
graphical games defined on a random, G(n,p), graph. We obtain a charac-
terization of the probability that a PNE exists as a function of the density
of the graph. The second set of results concerns random graphical games
on deterministic graphs. Here, we obtain conditions on the structure of the
graph under which a PNE does not exist with high probability, suggesting
also an efficient algorithm for finding witnesses of the nonexistence of a PNE.
We also give complementary conditions on the structure of the graph under
which a PNE exists with constant probability. Our results are described in
detail in Section 1.3.
Comparison to typical constraint satisfaction problems. Graphical games
provide a more compact way of representing large networks of interacting
agents than normal form games, in which the game is described as if it were
played on the complete graph. Besides the compact description, one of the
motivations for the Introduction of graphical games is their intuitive affin-
ity to graphical statistical models; indeed, several algorithms for graphical
games do have the flavor of algorithms for solving Bayes nets or constraint
satisfaction problems [10, 13, 16, 22, 23].
In the other direction, the notion of a PNE provides a new genre of con-
straint satisfaction problems; notably one in which, for any assignment of
strategies (values) to the neighborhood of a player (variable), there is always
a strategy (value) for that player which makes the constraint (1) correspond-
ing to that player satisfied (i.e., being in best response). The reason why it
might be hard to satisfy simultaneously the constraints corresponding to all
players is the long-range correlations that may arise between players. Indeed,
deciding whether a PNE exists is NP-hard, even for very sparse graphical
games [16].
Viewed as a constraint satisfaction problem, the problem of the existence
of PNE poses interesting challenges. First, for natural random ensembles
over payoff tables such as the one adopted in this paper (see Definition 1.2),
the expected number of PNE is 1 for any graph [this is shown for our model in
the main body of the paper; see (10)]. On the contrary, for typical constraint
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satisfaction problems, the expected number of solutions is exponential in the
size of the graph with different exponents corresponding to different density
parameters. Second, unlike typical constraint satisfaction problems studied
before, the existence of PNE is a priori not a monotone property of the
connectivity. It is surprising that given these novel features of the problem
it is possible to obtain a result establishing a double phase transition on the
existence of PNE as described below.
1.1. Our model. We define the notion of a graphical game and proceed
to describe the ensemble of random graphical games studied in this paper.
Definition 1.1 (Graphical game). Given a graph G= (V,E), we define
the neighborhood of node v ∈ V to be the set N (v) = {v′|(v, v′) ∈ E}. If
Sv is a set associated with vertex v, for all v ∈ V , we denote by SN (v) :=×v′∈N (v) Sv′ the Cartesian product of the sets associated with the nodes in
v’s neighborhood.
A graphical game on G is a collection (Sv, uv)v∈V , where Sv is the strategy
set of node v and uv :Sv × SN (v) → R the utility (or payoff ) function (or
table) of player v. We also define the best response function (or table) of
player v to be the function BRv :Sv × SN (v)→{0,1} such that
BRv(σv, σN (v)) = 1 ⇔ σv ∈ argxmax{uv(x,σN (v))},
for all σv ∈ Sv and σN (v) ∈ SN (v).
Definition 1.2 (Random graphical games on a fixed graph). Given a
graph G = (V,E) and an atomless distribution F over R, the probability
distribution DG,F over graphical games (Sv, uv)v∈V on G is defined as fol-
lows:
• Sv = {0,1}, for all v ∈ V ;
• the payoff values {uv(σv, σN (v))}v∈V,σv∈Sv,σN (v)∈SN (v) are mutually inde-
pendent and identically distributed according to F .
Remark 1.3 (Invariance under payoff distributions). It is easy to see
that the existence of a PNE is only determined by the best response tables
of the game; see condition (1). In particular, given that the distributions
considered in this paper are atomless, we can study PNE under DG,F , for
any atomless F , by restricting our attention (up to probability 0 events) to
the measure DG over best response tables, defined as follows:
• {BRv(0, σN (v))}v∈V,σN (v)∈SN (v) are mutually independent and uniform in
{0,1};
• BRv(1, σN (v)) = 1−BRv(0, σN (v)), for all σN (v) ∈ SN (v).
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We will sometimes refer to a graphical game defined in terms of its best
response tables as an underspecified graphical game. Other times, we will
overload our terminology and just call it a graphical game. We use PG[·]
and EG[·] to denote probabilities of events and expectations, respectively,
under the measure DG.
Remark 1.4 (Invariance under payoff distributions II). Given our ob-
servation in Remark 1.3, it follows that it is not important to use a common
distribution F for sampling the payoffs of all the players of the game. All our
results in this work are true if different players have different distributions
as long as these distributions are atomless and all payoffs values are sampled
independently.
Extending the model to random graphs. One of the goals of this paper
is to investigate what average degree is required in a graph for a graphical
game played on this graph to have a PNE. To study this question, it is
natural to consider families of graphs with different densities and relate the
probability of PNE existence with the density of the graph. We consider
graphical games on graphs drawn from the Erdo˝s–Re´nyi, G(n,p), model,
with varying values of the edge probability p. The ensemble of graphical
games we consider is formally the following.
Definition 1.5. Given n ∈N, p ∈ [0,1] and an atomless distribution F
over R, we define a measure D(n,p,F) over graphical games. A graphical game
is drawn from D(n,p,F) as follows:
• a graph G is drawn from G(n,p);
• a random graphical game is drawn from DG,F .
Remark 1.6 (Invariance under payoff distributions III). Given our dis-
cussion in Remark 1.3, it follows that in order to study PNE in the random
ensemble of Definition 1.5, it is sufficient to consider a measure that fixes
only the best response tables of the players in the sampled games.
For a given n ∈N and p ∈ [0,1], we define the measure D(n,p) over under-
specified graphical games. An underspecified graphical game is drawn from
D(n,p) as follows:
• a graph G is drawn from G(n,p);
• a random underspecified graphical game is drawn from DG.
We use P(n,p)[·] to denote probabilities of events under the measure D(n,p)
and PG[·] for probabilities of events measurable under G(n,p).
In the model defined in Definition 1.5 and Remark 1.6, there are two
sources of randomness: the selection of the graph, determining what players
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interact with each other, and the selection of the payoff tables. Note that in
the two-stage process that samples a graphical game from our distribution,
the payoff tables can only be realized once the graph is fixed. This justifies
the subscript G in the measure DG defined above.
1.2. Discussion.
Nonmonotonicity. Observe that the existence of a PNE is a nonmono-
tone property of p: any graphical game on the empty graph has a PNE for
trivial reasons; on the complete graph a random graphical game has a PNE
with asymptotic probability 1 − 1e (see [12, 28]); but our results indicate
that, when p is in some intermediate regime, a PNE does not exist with
probability approaching 1 as n→+∞ (see Theorem 1.10).
The nonmonotonicity in the average degree of the existence of a PNE
makes the relation between PNE and connectivity nonobvious. Surprisingly,
we show (Theorem 1.9) that the convergence to a Poisson distribution of
the distribution of the number of PNE in complete graphs [26, 33] extends
to much sparser graphs, as long as the average degree is at least logarithmic
in the number of players. If the sparsity increases further, we show (Theo-
rem 1.10) that a PNE does not exist with high probability, while if the graph
is essentially empty, PNE exist with probability 1 (Theorem 1.11). Our re-
sults establish a double phase transition consistent with the nonmonotonicity
of the model.
Methodological challenges. Our study here is an instance of studying
the satisfiability of constraint satisfaction problems (CSPs). The generic
question is to investigate the effect of the structure of the constraint graph
on the satisfiability of the problems defined on that graph, as well as their
computational complexity. In the context of CNF formulas (corresponding
to the satisfiability problem) the graph property most commonly studied in
the literature is the density of the hypergraph that contains an edge for each
clause of the formula (see, e.g., [14]). In other settings, different structural
properties of the constraint graph are relevant, for example, measures of
cyclicity of the graph [6, 17]. In our case, studying the average degree reveals
an interesting, nonmonotonic behavior of the model, as described above.
In a typical CSP, to show that a solution does not exist one either uses
the first moment method to exhibit that the expected number of solutions is
tiny [2], or finds a witness of unsatisfiability that exists with high probability.
To show that a satisfying assignment does exist it is quite common to use the
second moment method or its refinements, which have provided some of the
best bounds for satisfiability to date [1]. In our model the expected number of
satisfying assignments turns out to be 1 for any graph [see (10) below]. This
suggests that the analysis of the problem should be harder, since in particular
we cannot use the first moment method to establish the nonexistence of
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a PNE. Our proof of the nonexistence of PNE (Theorems 1.10 and 1.16)
uses succinct nonexistence witnesses that appear with high probability in
sufficiently sparse graphs. These witnesses are specific subgame structures
that do not possess a PNE with high probability. To establish the existence
of a PNE for sufficiently large densities (Theorems 1.9 and 1.13) we use
the second moment method. Further, we use Stein’s [4] method to establish
that the distribution of the number of PNE converges asymptotically to a
Poisson(1) distribution in this case.
1.3. Outline of main results. We describe first our results for random
graphs (for the measure D(n,p) defined in Remark 1.6), and proceed with our
results for deterministic graphs (for the measure DG defined in Remark 1.3).
PNE on random graphs. We study how the connectivity probability p in-
fluences the existence of PNE for games sampled from D(n,p). The transition
is described by the following theorems applying to different levels of graph
connectivity. Before stating the theorems, we introduce some notation.
Remark 1.7 (Order notation). Let f(x) and g(x) be two functions de-
fined on some subset of the real numbers. One writes f(x) =O(g(x)) if and
only if, for sufficiently large values of x, f(x) is at most a constant times
g(x) in absolute value. That is, f(x) =O(g(x)) if and only if there exists a
positive real number M and a real number x0 such that
|f(x)| ≤M |g(x)| for all x > x0.
Similarly, we write f(x) = Ω(g(x)) if and only if there exists a positive real
number M and a real number x0 such that
|f(x)| ≥M |g(x)| for all x > x0.
We casually use the order notation O(·) and Ω(·) throughout the paper.
Whenever we use O(f(n)) or Ω(f(n)) in some bound, there exists a constant
c > 0 such that the bound holds true for sufficiently large n if we replace the
O(f(n)) or Ω(f(n)) in the bound by c · f(n).
Remark 1.8 (Order notation continued). If g(n) is a function of n ∈N,
then we denote by ω(g(n)) any function f(n) such that f(n)/g(n)→+∞,
as n→ +∞; similarly, we denote by o(g(n)) any function f(n) such that
f(n)/g(n)→ 0, as n→ +∞. Finally, for two functions f(n) and g(n), we
write f(n)≫ g(n) whenever f(n) = ω(g(n)).
Theorem 1.9 (High connectivity). Let Z denote the number of PNE in
a graphical game sampled from D(n,p), where p = (2+ε) loge(n)n , ε = ε(n)> 0.
For an arbitrary constant c > 0 we assume that ε(n)> c and (in order for
p≤ 1) ε(n)≤ nloge(n) − 2.
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Under the above assumptions, for all finite n, with probability at least
1 − 2n−ε/8 over the random graph sampled from G(n,p), it holds that the
total variation distance between Z and a Poisson(1) r.v. W is bounded by
‖Z −W‖ ≤O(n−ε/8) + exp(−Ω(n)).(2)
In other words,
PG [‖Z −W‖ ≤O(n−ε/8) + exp(−Ω(n))]≥ 1− 2n−ε/8.(3)
In particular, the distribution of Z converges in total variation distance
to a Poisson(1) distribution, as n→+∞.
[Note that the two terms on the right-hand side of (2) can be of the same
order when ε is of the order of n/ loge(n).]
Theorem 1.10 (Medium connectivity). For all p = p(n) ≤ 1/n, if a
graphical game is sampled from D(n,p), the probability that a PNE exists is
bounded by
exp(−Ω(n2p)).
For p(n) = g(n)/n, where loge(n)/2 > g(n) > 1, the probability that a PNE
exists is bounded by
exp(−Ω(eloge(n)−2g(n))).
In particular, the probability that a PNE exists goes to 0 as n→+∞ for all
p= p(n) satisfying
1
n2
≪ p < (0.5− ε′(n)) loge(n)
n
,
where ε′(n) = ω( 1loge(n)
).
Theorem 1.11 (Low connectivity). For every constant c > 0, if a graph-
ical game is sampled from D(n,p) with p ≤ cn2 , the probability that a PNE
exists is at least (
1− c
n2
)n(n−1)/2
−→ e−c/2.
Note that our upper and lower bounds for G(n,p) leave a small gap, be-
tween p ≈ 0.5 loge(n)n and p ≈ 2 loge(n)n . The behavior of the number of PNE
in this range of p remains open. We establish the nonexistence of PNE for
medium connectivity graphs via a simple structure that prevents PNE from
arising, called the “indifferent matching pennies game” (see Definition 1.18
below). It is natural to ask whether our “indifferent matching pennies” wit-
nesses are (similarly to isolated vertices in connectivity) the smallest struc-
tures that prevent the existence of PNE and the last ones to disappear.
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General graphs. We give conditions on the structure of a graph implying
the (likely) existence or nonexistence of a PNE in a random game played on
that graph. The existence of a PNE is guaranteed by sufficient connectivity
of the underlying graph. The connectivity that we require is captured by the
notion of (α, δ)-expansion given next.
Definition 1.12 [(α, δ)-expansion]. A graphG= (V,E) has (α, δ)-expan-
sion iff every set V ′ such that |V ′| ≤ ⌈δ|V |⌉ has |N (V ′)| ≥min(|V |, α|V ′|)
neighbors. Here we let
N (V ′) = {w ∈ V :∃u∈ V ′ with (u,w) ∈E}.
[Note in particular that N (V ′) may intersect V ′.]
We show the following result.
Theorem 1.13 (Strongly connected graphs). Let Z denote the number
of PNE in a graphical game sampled from DG, where G is a graph on n
vertices that has (α, δ)-expansion with α= (1+ ε) log2(n), δ =
1
α and ε > 0.
Then the total variation distance between the distribution of Z and the dis-
tribution of a Poisson(1) r.v. W is bounded by
‖Z −W‖ ≤O(n−ε) +O(2−n/2).(4)
Next we provide a complementary condition for the nonexistence of PNE.
The condition will be given in terms of the following structure.
Definition 1.14 (d-bounded edge). An edge e= (u, v) ∈ E of a graph
G(V,E) is called d-bounded if both u and v have degrees smaller or equal
to d.
We bound the probability that a PNE exists in a game sampled from DG
as a function of the number of d-bounded edges in G. For the stronger version
of our theorem, we also need the notion of a maximal weighted independent
edge-set defined next.
Definition 1.15 (Maximal weighted independent edge-set). Given a
graph G(V,E), a subset E ⊆E of the edges is called independent if no pair
of edges in E are adjacent.
If w :E→R is a function assigning weights to the edges of G, we extend w
to subsets of edges by assigning to each E ⊆E the weight wE =
∑
e∈E w(e).
Then we call a subset E ⊆E of edges a maximal weighted independent edge-
set if E is an independent edge-set with maximal weight among independent
edge-sets.
Theorem 1.16. A random game sampled from DG, where G is a graph
with at least m vertex disjoint d-bounded edges, has no PNE with probability
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at least
1− exp(−m(18)2
2d−2
).(5)
In particular, if G has at least m edges that are d-bounded, then a game
sampled from DG has no PNE with probability at least
1− exp
(
−m
2d
(
1
8
)22d−2)
.(6)
Moreover, there exists an algorithm of complexity O(n2+m2d+2) for proving
that a PNE does not exist, which has success probability given by (5) and (6),
respectively.
More generally, let us assign to every edge (u, v) ∈E the weight
w(u,v) :=− loge(1− p(u,v)),
for p(u,v) = 8
−2du+dv−2 , where du and dv are, respectively, the degrees of u
and v. Given these weights, suppose that E is a maximal weighted indepen-
dent edge-set with value wE . Then the probability that there exists no PNE
is at least
1− exp(−wE ).
An easy consequence of this result is that many sparse graphs, such as
the line and the grid, do not have a PNE with probability tending to 1 as
the number of players increases.
The proof of Theorem 1.16 is based on a small witness for the nonexistence
of PNE, called the indifferent matching pennies game. As the name implies,
this game is inspired by the simple matching pennies game. Both games are
described next.
Definition 1.17 (The matching pennies game). We say that two play-
ers a and b play the matching pennies game if their payoff matrices are the
following, up to permuting the players’ names.
Payoff table of player a:
b plays 0 b plays 1
a plays 0 1 0
a plays 1 0 1
Payoff table of player b:
b plays 0 b plays 1
a plays 0 0 1
a plays 1 1 0
Definition 1.18 (The indifferent matching pennies game). We say that
two players a and b that are adjacent to each other in a graphical game play
the indifferent matching pennies game if, for all strategy profiles σN (a)∪N (b)\{a,b}
in the neighborhood of a and b, the players a and b play a matching pennies
game against each other.
In other words, for all fixed σ := σN (a)∪N (b)\{a,b}, the payoff tables of a
and b projected on σN (a)\{b} and σN (b)\{a}, respectively, are the following,
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up to permuting the players’ names.
Payoffs to player a:
b plays 0, other neighbors
play σN (a)\{b}
b plays 1, other neighbors
play σN (a)\{b}
a plays 0 1 0
a plays 1 0 1
Payoffs to player b:
a plays 0, other neighbors
play σN (b)\{a}
a plays 1, other neighbors
play σN (b)\{a}
b plays 0 0 1
b plays 1 1 0
Observe that if a graphical game contains an edge (u, v) so that players
u and v play the indifferent matching pennies game, then the game has no
PNE. In particular, the indifferent matching pennies game provides a small
witness for the nonexistence of a PNE, which is a coNP-complete problem for
bounded degree graphical games [16]. Our analysis implies that, with high
probability over bounded degree graphical games, there are short proofs for
the nonexistence of PNE which can be found efficiently. A related analysis
and randomized algorithm was introduced for mixed Nash equilibria in two-
player games by Ba´ra´ny, Vempala and Vetta [5].
1.4. Related work. The number of PNE in random games with i.i.d. pay-
offs has been extensively studied in the literature prior to our work: Gold-
berg, Goldman and Newman [15] characterize the probability that a two-
player random game with i.i.d. payoff tables has a PNE, as the number of
strategies tends to infinity. Dresher [12] and Papavassilopoulos [25] general-
ize this result to n-player random games on the complete graph. Powers [26]
and Stanford [33] generalize the result further, showing that the distribution
of the number of PNE approaches a Poisson(1) distribution as the number of
strategies increases. Finally, Rinott and Scarsini [28] investigate the asymp-
totic distribution of PNE for a more general ensemble of random games on
the complete graph where there are positive or negative dependencies among
the players’ payoffs.
Our work generalizes the above results for i.i.d. payoffs beyond the com-
plete graph to random graphical games on random graphs and several fam-
ilies of deterministic graphs. Parallel to our work, Dilkina, Gomes and Sab-
harwal [11] studied the existence of PNE in certain families of deterministic
graphs, and Hart, Rinott and Weiss [18] obtained results for evolutionarily
stable strategies in random games. These results are related but not directly
comparable to our results.
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2. Random graphs.
2.1. High connectivity. In this section we study the number of PNE in
graphical games sampled from D(n,p). We show that, when the average degree
is pn = (2 + ε(n)) loge(n), where ε(n) > c and c > 0 is any fixed constant,
the distribution of the number of PNE converges to a Poisson(1) random
variable, as n goes to infinity. This implies in particular that a PNE exists
with probability converging to 1− 1e as the size of the network increases.
As in the study of the complete graph in [28], we use the following result of
Arratia, Goldstein and Gordon [4], established using Stein’s method. For two
random variables Z,Z ′ supported on 0,1, . . . we define their total variation
distance ‖Z −Z ′‖ as
‖Z −Z ′‖ :=
∞∑
i=0
|Z(i)−Z ′(i)|.
Lemma 2.1 [4]. Consider arbitrary Bernoulli random variables Xi, i=
0, . . . ,N . For each i, define some neighborhood of dependence Bi of Xi such
that Bi satisfies that (Xj : j ∈Bci ) are independent of Xi. Let
Z =
N∑
i=0
Xi, λ= E[Z],(7)
and assume that λ > 0. Also, let
b1 =
N∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi
P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1]
and
b2 =
N∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi\{i}
P[Xi = 1,Xj = 1].
Then the total variation distance between the distribution of Z and a Poisson
random variable Wλ with mean λ is bounded by
‖Z −Wλ‖ ≤ 2(b1 + b2).(8)
Proof of Theorem 1.9. For ease of notation, we identify the players
of the graphical game with the indices 1,2, . . . , n. We also identify pure
strategy profiles with the integers in {0, . . . ,2n − 1}, mapping each integer
to a strategy profile. The mapping is defined so that, if the binary expansion
of i is i(1) · · · i(n), player k plays i(k).
Next, to each strategy profile i ∈ {0, . . . ,N}, where N = 2n− 1, we assign
an indicator random variable Xi which is 1 if the strategy profile i is a PNE.
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Then the counting random variable
Z =
N∑
i=0
Xi(9)
corresponds to the number of PNE. Hence the existence of a PNE is equiv-
alent to the random variable Z being positive.
Let us condition on a realization of the graph G of the graphical game,
but not its best response tables. For a given strategy profile i, each player is
in best response with probability 1/2 over the selection of her best response
table4; therefore EG[Xi] = 2
−n, for all i, where we recall that EG denotes
expectation under the measure DG. Hence, conditioning on G the expected
number of PNE is
EG[Z] = 1.(10)
Since this holds for any realization of the graph G it follows that E[Z] = 1.
In Lemma 2.2 that follows, we characterize the neighborhood of depen-
dence Bi of the variable Xi in order to be able to apply Lemma 2.1 on
the collection of variables X0, . . . ,XN . Note that this neighborhood depends
on the graph realization, but is independent of the realization of the payoff
tables.
Lemma 2.2. For a fixed graph G, we can choose the neighborhoods of
dependence for the random variables X0, . . . ,XN as follows:
B0 = {j :∃k such that ∀k′ with (k, k′) ∈E(G) it holds that j(k′) = 0}
and
Bi = i⊕B0 = {i⊕ j : j ∈B0},
where i⊕j = (i(1)⊕j(1), . . . , i(n)⊕j(n)) and ⊕ is the exclusive or operation.
Remark 2.3. Intuitively, when the graph G is realized, the neighbor-
hood of dependence of the strategy profile 0 (variable X0) contains all strat-
egy profiles j (variables Xj) assigning 0 to all the neighbors of at least one
player k. If such a player k exists, then whether 0 or j(k) is a best response
to the all-0 neighborhood are dependent random variables (over the selec-
tion of the best response table of player k). The definition of Bi in terms of
B0 is justified by the symmetry of our model.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. By symmetry, it is enough to show that X0 is
independent of {Xi}i/∈B0 . Fix some i /∈B0. Observe that in i, each player k of
the game has at least one neighbor k′ playing strategy 1. By the definition
of measure DG, it follows that whether strategy 0 is a best response for
4This follows directly from our model (Remark 1.6), following our assumption of atom-
less payoff distributions (Definition 1.5).
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player k in strategy profile 0 is independent of whether strategy i(k) is a
best response for player k in strategy profile i, since these events depend on
different strategy profiles of the neighbors of k. 
Now, for a fixed graph G, the functions b1(G) and b2(G) (corresponding
to b1 and b2 in Lemma 2.1) are well defined. We proceed to bound the
expectation of these functions over the sampling of the graph G:
EG [b1(G)] = EG
[
N∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi
PG[Xi = 1]PG[Xj = 1]
]
= EG
[
1
(N +1)2
N∑
i=0
|Bi|
]
(11)
=
EG [|B0|]
N +1
;
EG [b2(G)] = EG
[
N∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi\{i}
PG[Xi = 1,Xj = 1]
]
(12)
= (N + 1)
∑
j 6=0
EG[PG[X0 = 1,Xj = 1]I[j ∈B0]].
In the last line of both derivations we made use of the symmetry of the
model. Invoking symmetry again, we observe that the expectation
EG[PG[X0 = 1,Xj = 1]I[j ∈B0]]
in (12) depends only on the number of 1’s in the strategy profile j, denoted
s below. Let us write Ys for the indicator that the strategy profile js, where
the first s players play 1, and all the other players play 0, is a PNE. Also,
write Is for the indicator that this strategy is in B0 (note that Is is a function
of the graph only). Using this notation, we obtain
EG[b2(G)] = 2
n
n∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
EG [IsPG[Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]](13)
and
EG [b1(G)] = 2
−n
n∑
s=0
(
n
s
)
EG [Is].(14)
Lemma 2.4. EG[b1(G)] and EG [b2(G)] are bounded as follows:
EG[b1(G)]≤R(n,p) :=
n∑
s=0
(
n
s
)
2−nmin(1, n(1− p)s−1),
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EG[b2(G)]≤ S(n,p) :=
n∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
2−n[(1 + (1− p)s)n−s − (1− (1− p)s)n−s].
Proof. We begin with the study of EG[b1(G)]. Clearly, it suffices to
bound E[Is] by n(1−p)s−1, for s > 0. For the strategy profile js to belong in
B0 it must be that there is at least one player who is not connected to any
player in the set S := {1,2, . . . , s}. The probability that a specific player k is
not connected to any player in S is either (1− p)s or (1− p)s−1, depending
on whether k ∈ S; so it is always at most (1− p)s−1. By a union bound it
follows that the probability there is at least one player not connected to S
is at most n(1− p)s−1.
We now analyze EG[IsPG[Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]]. Recall from the previous para-
graph that Is = 1 only when there exists a player k who is not connected to
any player in S. If there exists such a player k with the extra property that
k ∈ S, then PG[Y0 = 1, Ys = 1] = 0, since it cannot be that both 0 and 1 are
best responses for player k when all her neighbors play 0.
Therefore the only contribution to EG [IsPG[Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]] is from the
event every player in S is connected to at least one other player in S. Con-
ditioning on this event, in order for Is = 1 it must be that at least one of
the players in Sc := V \ S is not adjacent to any player in S.
Let us define ps := PG[6 ∃ isolated node in the subgraph induced by S], and
let t denote the number of players in Sc, which are not connected to any
player in S. Since every player outside S is nonadjacent to any player in
S with probability (1 − p)s, the probability that exactly t players are not
adjacent to S is (
n− s
t
)
[(1− p)s]t(1− (1− p)s)n−s−t.
Moreover, conditioning on the event that exactly t players in Sc are not
adjacent to any player in S, we have that the probability that Y0 = 1 and
Ys = 1 is
1
2t
1
2n−t
1
2n−t
.
Putting these together we obtain
EG [IsPG[Y0 = 1, Ys = 1]]
= ps
n−s∑
t=1
(
n− s
t
)
[(1− p)s]t(1− (1− p)s)n−s−t 1
2t
1
4n−t
=
ps
4n
((2(1− p)s + (1− (1− p)s))n−s − (1− (1− p)s)n−s)
=
ps
4n
((1 + (1− p)s)n−s − (1− (1− p)s)n−s);
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therefore
EG[b2(G)] =
n∑
s=1
2−n
(
n
s
)
ps[(1 + (1− p)s)n−s − (1− (1− p)s)n−s]
≤ S(n,p). 
In the Appendix we show the following.
Lemma 2.5.
S(n,p)≤O(n−ε/4) + exp(−Ω(n))
and
R(n,p)≤O(n−ε/4) + exp(−Ω(n)).
Given the above bounds on EG [b1(G)] and EG [b2(G)], Markov’s inequality
implies that with probability at least 1− n−ε/8 − 2−n over the selection of
the graph G from G(n,p) we have
max(b1(G), b2(G))≤O(n−ε/8) + exp(−Ω(n)).(15)
Let us condition on the event that condition (15) holds. Under this event,
Lemma 2.1 implies that
‖Z −W‖ ≤ 2(b1(G) + b2(G))≤O(n−ε/8) + exp(−Ω(n))
as needed. Noting that 1− n−ε/8− 2−n ≥ 1− 2n−ε/8, we obtain
PG [‖Z −W‖ ≤O(n−ε/8) + exp(−Ω(n))]≥ 1− 2n−ε/8.(16)
Using the pessimistic upper bound of 2 on the total variation distance
when condition (15) fails, we obtain
‖Z −W‖ ≤O(n−ε/8) + exp(−Ω(n)).
Taking the limit of the above bound as n→+∞ we obtain our asymptotic
result. This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.9. 
2.2. Medium connectivity.
Proof of Theorem 1.10. Recall the matching pennies game from
Definition 1.17. It is not hard to see that this game does not have a PNE.
Hence, if a graphical game contains two players who are connected to each
other, are isolated from all the other players and play matching pennies
against each other, then the graphical game will have no PNE. The existence
of such a witness for the nonexistence of PNE is precisely what we use to
establish our result. In particular, we show that with high probability a
random game sampled from D(n,p) will contain an isolated edge between
two players playing a matching pennies game.
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We use the following exposure argument. Label the vertices of the graph
with the integers in [n] := {1, . . . , n}. Set Γ1 = [n] and perform the following
operations, which iteratively define the sets of vertices Γi, i≥ 2. If |Γi| ≤ n/2,
for some i≥ 2, stop the process and do not proceed to iteration i5:
• Let j be the minimal value such that j ∈ Γi.
• If j is adjacent to more than one vertex or to none, let Γi+1 = Γi \ ({j} ∪
N (j)). Go to the next iteration.
• Otherwise, let j′ be the unique neighbor of j. If j′ has a neighbor 6= j, let
Γi+1 = Γi \ ({j, j′} ∪N (j′)). Go to the next iteration.
• Otherwise check if the players j and j′ play a matching pennies game.6 If
this is the case, declare No Nash. Let Γi+1 = Γi \ {j, j′}. Go to the next
iteration.
Observe that the number of vertices removed at some iteration of the
process can be upper bounded (formally, it is stochastically dominated) by
2 +Bin(n,p),
where Bin(n,p) is a random variable distributed according to the binomial
distribution with n trials and success probability p. This follows from the
fact that the vertices removed at some iteration of the process are either the
examined vertex j and j’s neighbors [the number of those is stochastically
dominated by a Bin(n,p) random variable], or—if j has a single neighbor
j′—the removed vertices are j, j′ and the neighbors of j′ [the number of those
is also stochastically dominated by a Bin(n,p) random variable]. Letting
m := ⌈0.02n/(np+ 1)⌉, the probability that the process runs for at most m
iterations is bounded by
Pr[2m+Bin(mn,p)≥ n/2]≤ exp(−Ω(n)).
Condition on the information known to the exposure process up until the
beginning of iteration i, and assume that |Γi| > n/2. Let j be the vertex
with the smallest value in Γi. Now reveal all the neighbors of j, and if j has
only one neighbor j′ reveal also the neighbors of j′. The probability that j is
adjacent to a node j′ who has no other neighbors is at least n2 p(1− p)2n =:
piso; note that we made use of the condition |Γi|> n/2 in this calculation.
Conditioning on this event, the probability (over the selection of the payoff
tables) that j and j′ play a matching pennies game is 18 =: pmp. Hence, the
5Throughout the process Γi represents the set of vertices that could be adjacent to an
isolated edge, given the information available to the process at the beginning of iteration i.
6More precisely, check if the best response tables of the players j and j′ are the same
with the best response tables of the players a and b of the matching pennies game from
Definition 1.17 (up to permutations of the players’ names).
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probability of outputting No Nash in iteration i is at least 18
1
2np(1−p)2n =:
pimp.
The probability that the game has a PNE is upper bounded by the prob-
ability that the process described above does not return No Nash, at any
point through its completion. To upper bound the latter probability, let us
imagine the following alternative process:
1. Stage 1: Toss n coins independently at random with head probability piso.
Let I1,I2, . . . ,In ∈ {0,1}, where 1 represents “heads,” and 0 represents
“tails,” be the outcomes of these coin tosses.
2. Stage 2: Toss n coins independently at random with head probability
pmp. Let M1,M2, . . . ,Mn ∈ {0,1}, be the outcomes of these coin tosses.
3. Stage 3: Run through the exposure process in the following way. At each
iteration i:
• conditioning on the information available to the exposure process at
the beginning of the iteration, compute the probability pj that the
vertex j corresponding to the smallest number in Γi is adjacent to an
isolated edge; given the discussion above it must be that pj ≥ piso;
• if Ii = 1, then create an isolated edge connecting the player j to a
random vertex j′ ∈ Γi \ {j}, forbidding all other edges from j or j′
to any other player, and make the players j and j′ play a matching
pennies game if Mi = 1; if they do output No Nash;
• if Ii = 0, then sample the neighborhood of j from the following modified
model:
– with probability
pj−piso
1−piso
, create an isolated edge connecting the player
j to a random vertex j′ ∈ Γi \{j}, forbidding all other edges from j or
j′ to any other player, and make the players j and j′ play a matching
pennies game with probability pmp; if both of these happen, output
No Nash;
– with the remaining probability, sample the neighborhood of j and
the neighborhood of the potential unique neighbor j′ from G(n,p),
conditioning on j not being adjacent to an isolated edge.
• Define Γi+1 from Γi appropriately, and exit the process if |Γi+1| ≤ n/2.
It is clear that the process given above can be coupled with the process
defined earlier to exhibit the same behavior. But it is easier to analyze. In
particular, letting S :=∑mi=1 IiMi, the probability that a Nash equilibrium
does not exist can be lower bounded as follows:
PG[6 ∃ a PNE]≥ Pr
[
S ≥ 1∧ process runs for at
least m steps
]
≥ Pr[S ≥ 1]−Pr
[
process runs for
less than m steps
]
≥ 1− (1− pimp)m − exp(−Ω(n)).
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Hence, the probability that a PNE exists can be upper bounded by
exp(−Ω(n)) +
(
1− 1
16
np(1− p)2n
)m
≤ exp(−Ω(n)) + exp(−Ω(mnp(1− p)2n))
≤ exp(−Ω(mnp(1− p)2n)).
For p≤ 1/n the last expression is
exp(−Ω(n2p)),
while for p= g(n)/n where g(n)≥ 1 the expression is
exp(−Ω(n(1− p)2n)) = exp(−Ω(ne−2g(n))) = exp(−Ω(eloge(n)−2g(n))).
This completes the proof of Theorem 1.10. 
2.3. Low connectivity.
Proof of Theorem 1.11. Note that if the graphical game is comprised
of isolated edges that are not matching pennies games, then a PNE exists.
(This can be checked easily by enumerating all best response tables for a 2×2
game.) We wish to lower bound the probability of this event. To do this, it is
convenient to sample the graphical game in two stages as follows: at the first
stage we decide for each of the possible
(n
2
)
edges whether the edge is present
(with probability p) and whether it is predisposed to be a matching pennies
game (independently with probability 1/8); by “predisposed” we mean that
the edge will be set to be a matching pennies game if the edge turns out to
be isolated. At the second stage, we do the following: for an edge that is both
isolated and predisposed, we assign random payoff tables to its endpoints
conditioning on the resulting game being a matching pennies game; for an
isolated edge that is not predisposed, we assign random payoff tables to its
endpoints conditioning on the resulting game not being a matching pennies
game; finally, for any node that is part of a connected component with 0 or
at least 2 edges we assign random payoff tables to the node. The probability
that there is no edge in the first stage that is both present and predisposed is
(1− p/8)(n2).
Conditioning on this event, all present edges are not predisposed. Note also
that, when c is fixed, the probability that there exists a pair of adjacent
edges is o(1). It follows that the probability that all present edges are not
predisposed and no pair of edges intersect can be lower bounded as
(1− p/8)(n2) − o(1) =
(
1− c
8n2
)n(n−1)/2
− o(1).
But, as explained above if all edges are isolated and none of them is a
matching pennies game a PNE exists. Hence, the probability that a PNE
20 C. DASKALAKIS, A. G. DIMAKIS AND E. MOSSEL
exists is at least (
1− c
8n2
)n(n−1)/2
− o(1)−→ e−c/16.

3. Deterministic graphs.
3.1. A sufficient condition for existence of equilibria: Strong connectivity.
Proof of Theorem 1.13. We use the same notation as in the proof
of Theorem 1.9, except that we make the slight modification of setting N :=
2n − 1. Recall that Xi, i= 0,1, . . . ,N − 1, is the indicator random variable
of the event that the strategy profile encoded by the number i is a PNE. It
is rather straightforward (see the proof of Theorem 1.9) to show that
E[Z] = E
[
N−1∑
i=0
Xi
]
= 1.
As in the proof of Theorem 1.9, to establish our result, it suffices to bound
the following quantities:
b1(G) =
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi
P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1],
b2(G) =
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi\{i}
P[Xi = 1,Xj = 1],
where the neighborhoods of dependence Bi are defined as in Lemma 2.2.
For S ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, denote by i(S) the strategy profile in which the players
of the set S play 1 and the players not in S play 0. Then writing 1(j ∈B)
for the indicator of the event that j ∈B we have
b2(G) =
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi\{i}
P[Xi = 1,Xj = 1]
=
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j 6=i
P[Xi = 1,Xj = 1]1(j ∈Bi)
=N
∑
j 6=0
P[X0 = 1,Xj = 1]1(j ∈B0) (by symmetry)
=N
n∑
k=1
∑
S,|S|=k
P[X0 = 1,Xi(S) = 1]1(i(S) ∈B0).
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We will bound the sum above by bounding
N
⌊δn⌋∑
k=1
∑
S,|S|=k
P[X0 = 1,Xi(S) = 1]1(i(S) ∈B0)(17)
and
N
n∑
k=⌊δn⌋+1
∑
S,|S|=k
P[X0 = 1,Xi(S) = 1]1(i(S) ∈B0)(18)
separately.
Note that if some set S satisfies |S| ≤ ⌊δn⌋, then |N (S)| ≥ α|S| since
the graph has (α, δ)-expansion. Moreover, each vertex (player) of the set
N (S) is playing its best response to the strategies of its neighbors in both
profiles 0 and i(S) with probability 14 , since its environment is different in
the two profiles. On the other hand, each player not in that set is in best
response in both profiles 0 and i(S) with probability at most 12 . Hence, we
can bound (17) by
N
⌊δn⌋∑
k=1
∑
S,|S|=k
P[X0 = 1,Xi(S) = 1]
≤N
⌊δn⌋∑
k=1
∑
S,|S|=k
(
1
2
)n−αk(1
4
)αk
=
⌊δn⌋∑
k=1
(
n
k
)(
1
2
)αk
<
(
1 +
(
1
2
)α)n
− 1≤ en−ε.
To bound the second term, notice that, if some set S satisfies |S| ≥ ⌊δn⌋+1,
then since the graph has (α, δ)-expansion N (S) ≡ V , and, therefore, the
environment of every player is different in the two profiles 0 and i(S). Hence,
1(i(S) ∈B0) = 0. By combining the above we get that
b2(G)≤ en−ε.
It remains to bound the expression b1(G). We have
b1(G)− 2−n =
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j∈Bi\{i}
P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1]
=
N−1∑
i=0
∑
j 6=i
P[Xi = 1]P[Xj = 1]1(j ∈Bi)
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= 2−n
∑
j 6=0
1(j ∈B0)
= 2−n
⌊δn⌋∑
k=1
∑
S,|S|=k
1(i(s) ∈B0)
+ 2−n
n∑
k=⌊δn⌋+1
∑
S,|S|=k
1(i(s) ∈B0).
The second term is zero as before. For all large enough n the first summation
contains at most 2n/2 terms and is therefore bounded by 2−n/2. It follows
that
b1(G) + b2(G)≤ en−ε +2−n/2.
An application of the result by Arratia, Goldstein and Gordon [4] concludes
the proof of Theorem 1.13. 
3.2. A sufficient condition for the nonexistence of equilibria: Indifferent
matching pennies. In this section we provide a proof of Theorem 1.16. Re-
call that an edge of a graph is called d-bounded if both adjacent vertices
have degrees smaller or equal to d. Theorem 1.16 specifies that any graph
with many such edges is unlikely to have PNE. We proceed to the proof of
the claim.
Proof of Theorem 1.16. Consider a d-bounded edge in a game con-
necting two players a and b; suppose that each of these players interacts with
d−1 (or fewer) other players denoted by a1, a2, . . . , ad−1 and b1, b2, . . . , bd−1.7
Recall that if a and b play an indifferent matching pennies game against
each other then the game has no PNE. The key observation is that a d-
bounded edge is an indifferent matching pennies game with probability at
least (18 )
22d−2 =: pimp—since a random two-player game is a matching pen-
nies game with probability 18 , and there are at most 2
2d−2 possible pure
strategy profiles for the players a1, a2, . . . , ad−1, b1, b2, . . . , bd−1; for each of
these pure strategy profiles the game between a and b must be a matching
pennies game.
For a collection of m vertex disjoint edges, observe that the events that
each of them is an indifferent matching pennies game are independent.
Hence, the probability that the game has a PNE is upper bounded by the
probability that none of these edges is an indifferent matching pennies game,
which is upper bounded by
(1− pimp)m ≤ exp(−mpimp) = exp(−m(18 )2
2d−2
).
7We allow these lists to share players.
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For the second claim of the theorem note that, if there are m d-bounded
edges, then there must be at least m/(2d) vertex disjoint d-bounded edges.
The algorithmic statement follows from the fact that we may find all
nodes with degree ≤d in time O(n2), and then find all edges joining two
such nodes in another O(n2) time, with the use of the appropriate data
structures; these edges are the d-bounded edges of the graph. Then in time
O(m2d+2) we can check if the endpoints of any such edge play an indifferent
matching pennies game.
The final claim of the theorem has a similar proof where now the potential
witnesses for the nonexistence of a PNE are the edges in E . 
Many random graphical games on deterministic graphs such as players
arranged on a line, grid, or any other bounded degree graph [with ω(1)
edges] are special cases of the above theorem and hence are unlikely to have
PNE asymptotically.
APPENDIX: OMITTED PROOFS
Proof of Lemma 2.5. We need to bound the functions S(n,p) and
R(n,p). We begin with S.
Bounding S. Recall that
S(n,p) :=
n∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
2−n[(1 + (1− p)s)n−s − (1− (1− p)s)n−s].
We split the range of the summation into four regions and bound the sum
over each region separately. We begin by choosing α= α(ε) as follows:
(i) if ε≤ 1790105 , we choose α= ( ε2+ε)20;
(ii) if ε > 1790105 , we choose α=
ε
2+ε .
Given our choice of α= α(ε) we define the following regions in the range of
s (where—depending on ε—Regions I and/or III may be empty and Region
IV may have overlap with Region II):
I. {s ∈N|1≤ s < ε(2+ε)p};
II. {s ∈N| ε(2+ε)p ≤ s < αn};
III. {s ∈N|αn≤ s < 12+εn};
IV. {s ∈N| 12+εn≤ s < n}.
We then write
S(n,p)≤ SI(n,p) + SII(n,p) + SIII(n,p) + SIV(n,p),
where SI(n,p) denotes the sum over region I etc., and bound each term
separately.
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Region I. The following lemma will be useful.
Lemma A.1. For all ε > 0, p ∈ (0,1) and s such that 1≤ s < ε(2+ε)p ,
(1− p)s ≤ 1− (2 + 0.5ε)sp
2 + ε
.
Proof. First note that, for all k ≥ 1,(
s
2k+ 2
)
p2k+2 ≤
(
s
2k +1
)
p2k+1.(19)
To verify the latter note that it is equivalent to
s≤ 2k+1+ 2k+2
p
,
which is true since s≤ ε(2+ε)p = 1(2/ε+1)p ≤ 1p .
Using (19), it follows that
(1− p)s ≤ 1−
(
s
1
)
p+
(
s
2
)
p2.(20)
Note finally that
0.5ε
2 + ε
sp >
s(s− 1)
2
p2,
which applied to (20) gives
(1− p)s ≤ 1− (2 + 0.5ε)sp
2 + ε
. 
Assuming that Region I is nonempty and applying Lemma A.1 we get
SI(n,p)≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + (1− p)s)n−s
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(
n
s
)
2−n
(
1 + 1− (2 + 0.5ε)sp
2 + ε
)n−s
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(
n
s
)
2−s
(
1− (1 + 0.25ε)sp
2 + ε
)n−s
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(
n
s
)
2−s exp
(
−(1 + 0.25ε)sp
2 + ε
(n− s)
)
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≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(
n
s
)
2−s exp
(
−(1 + 0.25ε)sp
2 + ε
n
)
× exp
(
(1 + 0.25ε)sp
2 + ε
s
)
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(
n
s
)
2−s exp(−(1 + 0.25ε) loge(n)s)
× exp
(
(1 + 0.25ε)ε
(2 + ε)2
s
)
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
ns2−sn−(1+0.25ε)s exp
(
1
2
s
)
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(√
e
2
)s
n−0.25εs
≤
∑
s<ε/((2+ε)p)
(√
e
2
)s
n−0.25ε
≤ n−0.25ε
∑
s<2ε/((2+ε)p)
(√
e
2
)s
=O(n−0.25ε)
(
since
√
e
2
< 1
)
.
Region II. We have
SII(n,p)≤
∑
ε/((2+ε)p)≤s<αn
(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + (1− p)s)n
≤
∑
ε/((2+ε)p)≤s<αn
(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + e−ps)n
≤
∑
ε/((2+ε)p)≤s<αn
(
n
αn
)
2−n(1 + e−pε/((2+ε)p))n
(21)
≤ αn
(
n
αn
)(
1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
2
)n
≤ αn2nH(α)(n+1)
(
1 + e−ε/(2+ε)
2
)n
≤ αn(n+1)
(
2H(α) · 1 + e
−ε/(2+ε)
2
)n
.
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In the above derivation H(·) represents the entropy function, and for the
second to last derivation we used the fact that(
n
k
)
≤ (n+ 1)2nH(k/n).(22)
Our definition of the function α= α(ε) guarantees that when ε≤ 1790105(
2H(α) · 1 + e
−ε/(2+ε)
2
)
≤ 0.999,
while when ε > 1790105 (
2H(α) · 1 + e
−ε/(2+ε)
2
)
≤ 0.99.
Using the above and (21) we obtain
SII(n,p) = exp(−Ω(n)).(23)
Region III. Let us assume that the region is nonempty. We show that
each positive term in the summation SIII(n,p) is exponentially small. Since
there are O(n) terms in the summation, it follows then that SIII(n,p) is
exponentially small:(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + (1− p)s)n
≤
(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + e−ps)n ≤
(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + e−pαn)n(24)
≤
(
n
s
)
2−n(1 + e−(2+ε)α loge(n))n
=
(
n
s
)
2−n
(
1 +
1
n(2+ε)α
)n
=
(
n
s
)
2−n
(
1 +
1
n(2+ε)α
)n(2+ε)αn1−(2+ε)α
≤
(
n
s
)
2−nen
1−(2+ε)α
≤ (n+1)2nH(s/n)2−nen1−(2+ε)α
≤ (n+1)2nH(1/(2+ε))2−nen1−(2+ε)α
= (n+1)2n(H(1/(2+ε))−1)en
1−(2+ε)α
,
where in the third-to-last line of the derivation we employed the bound
of (22). Notice that the right-hand side of (24), seen as a function of ε > 0
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and α> 0, is decreasing in both. Since ε > c, our choice of α= α(ε) implies
that α > ( cc+2)
20. Hence, we can bound the right-hand side of (24) as follows:
(n+ 1)2−n(1−H(1/(2+c)))en
1−(2+c)(c/(c+2))20
= exp(−Ω(n)),
where we used the fact that c is a constant, and therefore the factor en
1−(2+c)(c/(c+2))20
is sub-exponential in n, while the factor 2−n(1−H(1/(2+c))) is exponentially
small in n.
Region IV. Note that, if xk ≤ 1, then by the mean value theorem
(1 + x)k − (1− x)k ≤ 2x max
1−1/k≤y≤1+1/k
kyk−1
= 2kx(1 + 1/k)k−1
≤ 2ekx.
We can apply this for k = n− s and x= (1− p)s since
(n− s)(1− p)s ≤ (n− s)e−ps
≤ (n− s)e−(2+ε) loge(n)/n(n/(2+ε))
≤ n− s
n
≤ 1.
Hence, SIV(n,p) is bounded as follows:
SIV(n,p)≤
∑
n/(2+ε)≤s≤n
(
n
s
)
2−n2e(n− s)(1− p)s
≤ 2e · 2−n · n
∑
n/(2+ε)≤s≤n
(
n
s
)
(1− p)s
≤ 2e · 2−n · n(1 + (1− p))n
≤ 2en
(
1− p
2
)n
≤ 2ene−p/2n
≤ 2ene−(2+ε) loge(n)/(2n)n
≤ 2enn−(2+ε)/2
≤ 2en−ε/2.
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Putting everything together. Combining the above we get that
S(n,p)≤O(n−ε/4) + exp(−Ω(n)).
Bounding R. Observe that
R(n,p) = 2−n +
n∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
2−nmin(1, n(1− p)s−1).
We bound R as follows:
R(n,p)− 2−n
≤
n∑
s=1
(
n
s
)
2−nmin(1, n exp(−p(s− 1)))
≤ 2−n
∑
1≤s≤n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
(
n
s
)
+ 2−n
∑
s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
(
n
s
)
n exp(−p(s− 1))
≤ 2−n
∑
1≤s≤n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
(n+1)2nH(s/n)
+ 2−n
∑
s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
(
n
s
)
n exp(−p(s− 1))
≤ n(n+1)2−n2nH((3+ε)/(6+3ε))
+ 2−n
∑
s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
(
n
s
)
n exp(−p(s− 1))
≤ exp(−Ω(n)) + 2−n
∑
s>n(3+ε)/(6+3ε)
(
n
s
)
n exp(−p(s− 1)),
where in the last line of the derivation we used that ε > c > 0 for some
absolute constant c. To bound the last sum we observe that when s > n(3+ε)6+3ε
we have
n exp(−p(s− 1))≤ n exp
(
−(2 + ε) loge(n)
n
(
n(3 + ε)
6 + 3ε
− 1
))
≤ n · n−(2+ε)(3+ε)/(6+3ε) · exp
(
(2 + ε) loge(n)
n
)
≤ n−ε/3 · n2/n · nε/n =O(n−ε/4).
Using this bound and the fact
∑n
s=0
(
n
s
)
= 2n concludes the proof. 
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